股权激励与高管择机行为的研究

中文摘要

中国的市场经济在过去几十年取得了无可否认的惊人成就，各型企业也在不断探索和创新中获得了成长，但由于高管追求个人利益最大化，将个人利益凌驾于集体利益之上，投机行为屡教不改，导致市场秩序并未处于良性发展阶段，负面问题不断出现，阻碍了市场秩序的健康发展，突出表现是有的公司出于福利的动机选择股权激励，注重股权出售的获利以及获取股权的成本高于公司长期价值本身，引发机会主义行为倾向。在本篇文章中，将以国内上市公司2018年向外部市场所披露的425个股权激励方案作为样本对象，运用万得资讯金融终端以及锐思金融数据库收集和整理了以下原始数据：样本公司预案公告日当日收盘价、预案公告前180交易日的收盘价以及股权激励方案行权价，最后通过统计分析法对股权激励中机会主义择机行为的存在性进行实证检验。

关键词： 股权激励；择机行为

ABSTRACT

China’s market economy has achieved undeniable achievements in the past few decades, and various types of enterprises have also grown up in continuous exploration and innovation. However, because executives pursue personal interests to maximize personal interests, they are in the collective interest. On the other hand, the speculative behavior has not been changed, resulting in the market order not being in a benign development stage. Negative problems are constantly appearing, hindering the healthy development of the market order. The outstanding performance is that some companies choose equity incentives for welfare motives and focus on the profit of equity sales. And the cost of acquiring equity is higher than the company's long-term value itself, triggering opportunistic behavioral tendencies. In this article, we will use the 425 equity incentive plans disclosed by domestic listed companies to the external market in 2018 as sample objects, and use the Wind Info Financial Terminal and the Ruisi Financial Database to collect and organize the following raw data: sample company plan The closing price on the announcement day, the closing price of the 180 trading days before the announcement, and the exercise price of the equity incentive plan, finally through the statistical analysis method to empirically test the existence of opportunistic opportunistic behavior in equity incentives.

Keywords: Stock options; Manipulation of Option Exercise Data

目录

1.绪论1

2.我国股权激励模式的介绍2

3.理论基础2

3.1信息不对称论2

3.2委托代理理论3

3.3管理层权力理论3

3.4研究假设4

4.股权激励中机会主义择机行为存在程度的实证检验4

4.1研究设计4

4.1.1样本选取及数据来源4

4.1.2研究方法4

4.2有关机会主义择机行为的检验分析5

4.2.1基于行权价与前一日收盘价、前30日平均收盘价比较的分析5

4.2.2基于预案公告前一日收盘价在前30日收盘价中相对位置的分析6

4.2.3基于公告前30、前31~60和前61~90日平均收盘价比较的分析7

4.2.4基于预案公告日收盘价在公告前30、前60、前90、前180日收盘价中相对位置的分析8

4.2.5基于行权价在预案公告前30日收盘价中相对位置的分析10

5．政策建议10

5.1完善公司激励契约设计10

5.2完善内部监督机制 11

5.3増强信息披露质量11

结论11

参考文献13